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Do Board Directors Affect the Export Propensity and Export Performance of 
Korean Firms? A Resource Dependence Perspective 
 
Abstract 
Using the Heckman two-stage method, this study empirically investigates whether board 
directors’ work experience in government and multinational corporations (MNCs), as well as 
the proportion of outside directors affects export propensity and export performance based on 
a sample of Korean firms. We find that the Korean firms with former government officials on 
the board are more likely to engage in exporting, although there is no empirical evidence 
supporting export performance. The findings also show that firms with former MNC 
employees on the board demonstrate higher levels of export propensity and export 
performance. Similarly, firms with a higher proportion of outside directors exhibit a higher 
level of export propensity and export performance. These findings highlight the importance 
of the board of directors in Korean firms’ first stage of internationalization and provide new 
insights into which type of board members can benefit their firms in terms of export 
propensity and export performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Exporting is considered as the first step to internationalization because it requires the 
commitment of minimal resources, involves lower risks compared to other international 
strategies and allows for greater flexibility (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 2007; Leonidou, 
Palihawadana, & Theodosiou, 2011). Firms engaging in exporting, however, encounter 
various obstacles that may negatively affect their overall performance (Leonidou, 
Palihawadana, & Theodosiou, 2011). Obstacles to exporting are associated both with internal 
resource constraints and external barriers (Leonidou, 1995a; Miesenbock, 1988). 
Contemporary organizations, therefore, are constantly leveraging internal resources and 
seeking external resources that will enable them to overcome the barriers to exporting, 
mitigate the associated risks and boost export performance.  
Previous studies on export performance have tended to focus on various aspects related 
to firms’ capabilities, industry competition and institutional environments (Buck, et al., 2007; 
Chen, Sousa, & He, 2016; Gao, et al., 2010). A major limitation of this stream of research is 
that it has overlooked the role of the board of directors in facilitating export performance 
(Herrera-Echeverri, et al, 2016; Barroso, et al, 2011). Despite the role that the board of 
directors plays in achieving key organizational outcomes, such as exporting, our 
understanding of the relationship between the board of directors and export performance 
remains relatively fragmented (Herrera-Echeverri et al, 2016; Barroso, et al, 2016; Rivas et 
al, 2009). 
A related issue is that prior literature in corporate governance has mainly focused on 
examining the role of the board of directors in enhancing firm financial performance 
(Chizema et al., 2015; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; 
4 
 
Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2014, Ntim, 2015) and firm value (Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012a). There 
is less research examining the effect of the board of directors on other types of business 
activities, such as exporting. In particular, the extent to which the composition of the board of 
directors affects exporting is underexplored (Rivas, 2012a, 2012b; Rivas, Hamori, & Mayo, 
2009; Sanders & Carpenters, 1998). This neglect, therefore, limits our understanding of 
which types of board directors can benefit exporting.  
Another limitation of prior literature is that although it has extensively recognized the 
monitoring or governance role of the board of directors, as suggested by agency theory 
(Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978),  it has overlooked board 
directors’ resource provision role, especially in supporting exporting (Hillman, Withers, & 
Collins, 2009; López Rodríguez and García Rodríguez, 2005). In the context of international 
business (IB), this neglect is paradoxical, as the role of a board in gaining access to 
specialized knowledge concerning foreign markets and acquiring other types of resources 
necessary for exporting can be crucial (Rivas, 2012a, 2012b; Rivas, Hamori, & Mayo, 2009).  
A further weakness of previous investigation in this area is that much research has 
focused on Western contexts (Chizema et al., 2015; Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013; Ntim, 
Opong, & Danbolt, 2015). However, corporate governance mechanisms, such as the board of 
directors in emerging countries, differ from those in Western countries (Buck, Liu & 
Skovoroda, 2008; Chizema et al., 2015; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2015). There have been 
many regulatory changes aimed at improving the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
many emerging countries (Chizema et al., 2015). Such changes are very prominent in Asia, as 
a result of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. It is widely recognized that Asian 
corporate governance differs from the Anglo-American model and German model and, hence, 
an investigation into the role of directors in the Asian context is crucial in order to better 
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understand the resource provision role of the board of directors in exporting. In particular, the 
Korean government leads the market economy system, and the relationship between 
businesses and the government is closely intertwined. Government officials can use their 
power to provide preferential treatment for the firms with which they have developed close 
links. Seeking crucial resources from the government through political ties is a fact of Korean 
business life (Siegel, 2007). Such an institutional setting makes the role of the board of 
directors even more pivotal in gaining access to the external resources needed for exporting. 
Thus, Korea represents an interesting and important context for such an investigation.  
To address the research gaps identified above, we aim to investigate the role of the board 
of directors as resource providers in exporting by adopting a resource dependence perspective 
based on a sample of Korean firms. Specifically, we examine to what extent a board’s 
specific characteristics and outside directors affect a firm’s export propensity and export 
performance.  
Our paper makes three main contributions to IB and corporate governance research. 
First, this study reveals that the role of the board of directors is more than just monitoring and 
controlling, thus expanding our understanding of the impact of the board of directors as 
critical resource providers on exporting. Specifically, we focus on two types of board 
directors: those who are former government officials, and those who have multinational 
corporation (MNC) experience. In doing so, this study delineates the resource dependence 
logic of board directors and offers new insights into which type of board members can be of 
benefit to their firms’ export propensity and export performance.  
Second, we examine the unique context of Korea, where so far there has been scarce 
academic investigation. Our study extends prior research based on developed country 
contexts to the Korean context and sheds new light on the effects of the unique institutional 
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characteristics of Korea, as well as the government imposed changes on the composition of 
company boards, particularly with regard to their impact on the firms’ export propensity and 
export performance. Our research responds to the call for more context-specific approaches 
in the study of board directors (Ntim et al., 2015; Chizema et al., 2015).  
Finally, this study adds much needed empirical evidence on the link between the board of 
directors and exporting in the Korean context. We have adopted the Heckman two-stage 
model to control for endogeneity problems. Moreover, we have provided additional evidence 
on the impact of different types of the board of directors on export propensity and 
performance using the simultaneous quantile regression. 
 
 2. Research context 
 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 led many countries in the continent to undertake 
significant corporate governance reforms. These reforms did not completely follow the 
Western models of corporate governance and, for this reason, studies into corporate 
governance, such as the role of board directors should pay particular attention to the unique 
features of the Asian context (Chizema et al, 2015; Lu, Xu, & Liu, 2009). Thus, in this 
section, we present three unique institutional characteristics of corporate governance in the 
Korean context.  
First, the Korean government has historically implemented various policies to support 
exporting and has played a dominant role in firm internationalization (Chang & Hong, 2002). 
Elite public officials have access to significant government-related resources (including 
information on public policy changes, government funds, links to government owned 
financial institutions etc.). When retired public officials move to work for private firms they 
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are able to utilize their links to the government, work as lobbyists and receive preferential 
treatment. These former government officials can support firms by obtaining resources from 
their previous government bodies called ‘jeongwan yeu’. Such resources include important 
information in relation to government policy changes, but also other government-related 
resources such as trade finance and trade insurance from the state-owned banks and 
institutions (Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission of Korea, 2012). According to the 
Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission of Korea (2012), these former government 
officials are well known in Korea both for their networks and contacts in the public sector, 
but also their ability to lobby in favour of the companies that they later on work for.  
Second, the Asian financial crisis impacted on Korean firms’ recruiting strategies to shift 
the emphasis from hiring lifetime employees to recruiting experienced employees (Kim & 
Kim, 2003; Kim & Yu, 2000). Before the Asian financial crisis, Korean firms dominated the 
Korean market. However, a number of Korean firms were sold to MNCs such as GM and 
Renault during the financial crisis (Chang, 2006). Spontaneously, Korean firms tried to hire 
MNC-experienced board members in order to benefit from their international experience and 
the MNCs networks with which they had previously worked (Bae et al., 2003). Thus, this 
new trend in the hiring strategy adopted by Korean firms after the Asian financial crisis raises 
an important research question with regard to the role of board members with MNC 
experience in their firms’ export propensity and export performance.   
Third, the reform of corporate governance regulations in Korea after the Asian financial 
crisis required Korean firms to have at least 25% of their boards made up of outside directors. 
This development resulted from changes in the Commercial Code in 1998 and the Securities 
and Exchange Act in 1999. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) obliged 
large Korean firms with total assets over two trillion Korean won to be composed of at least 
8 
 
50% outside directors (Chizema & Kim, 2010). Given the importance of the board system, its 
relatively short history in the Korean economy, and the rapid changes in related government 
regulations, we maintain that the Korean context represents a unique but also immensely 
fruitful setting for investigation.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) introduced RDT to explain how organizations reduce 
environmental interdependence and uncertainty. According to RDT, organizations are open 
systems which are not self-sufficient due to their dependence on the external environment to 
gain the material or symbolic resources that they require (Durand & Jourdan, 2012; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). To ensure their existence and their sustainable growth, organizations must 
manage environmental demands to secure a stable supply of critical resources, such as 
financial capital, production inputs and legitimacy. Organizations are both supported and 
constrained by their external environments (Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Oliver, 
1991). Thus, successful organizations must develop ways to effectively cope with their 
environmental needs, manage resource dependencies and counteract the power of key 
resource holders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
From an RDT perspective, the government and its agencies constitute a source of scarce 
resources sought by firms, and a dependency situation arises when firms rely on crucial 
resources controlled by government (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The board of directors is 
appointed to facilitate access to various external resources controlled by the government, and 
reduce environmental uncertainty. Given that exporters need to obtain diverse resources from 
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outside organizations to alleviate uncertainty (Tesfom, Lutz, & Ghauri, 2004), RDT provides 
a useful lens with which to examine the determinants of a firm’s export performance.  
The board of directors can contribute various resources that will facilitate a firm’s 
internationalization strategy (George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005; Hillman, Cannella, & 
Paetzold, 2000). Rivas (2012a) argues that the diversity of the board can lessen 
internationalization-related uncertainty by exploiting directors’ diverse knowledge, skills and 
abilities. Given that successful internationalization requires a multidimensional approach to 
reduce costs and environmental complexity (George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005), Rivas’s study 
has particular implications for the current study because the resources that boards provide to 
the firm are associated with their knowledge, experience, skills, and social networks. Based 
on the above theoretical perspective, we propose and test a number of hypotheses by focusing 
on the extent to which different types of boards affect exports, especially the export 
propensity and export performance of Korean firms. 
A few studies have examined Asian firms’ first steps towards internationalization 
measured by export propensity and export performance. Based on a sample of Chinese firms, 
Filatotchev, et al. (2009) and Gao et al. (2010) focused on the impact of firms’ internal 
resources on export propensity and export performance by adopting the knowledge based 
view and RBV, respectively. Buck et al. (2007) explored Chinese firms’ export propensity 
and export performance based on Dunning’s trade development path. Similarly, Zhao and 
Zou (2002) examined the impact firm specific internal factors such as firm size and capital 
intensity have on export propensity and export performance. Despite the fact that board 
directors bring scarce resources from external organizations (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), extant literature in the Asian context has overlooked board 
directors’ resource provision role, which is crucial for successful exporting (Rodríguez & 
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Rodríguez, 2005). In particular, the government leads the market economy system and is 
heavily involved in developing an export-oriented economy in the Asian context (Chang & 
Hong, 2000).  
 
4. Hypotheses Development 
4.1 Government experience and exporting  
From an RDT perspective, a firm needs to exploit external resources to reduce 
environmental uncertainty and achieve sustainable competitiveness (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003). The availability of external resources may vary depending on a firm’s business 
environment, especially with the government being considered the most important resource 
provider. Firms are frequently influenced by government in many business aspects (Hillman, 
2005). A good relationship with the government, therefore, is one of the most significant 
resources for contemporary organizations. In this respect, the employment of a former 
government official as a board member can be a very significant resource that will bring links 
to the government as well as political experience.  
A large body of research, stemming from an RDT perspective, supported these insights. 
Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer (2002) noted that organizational members with government 
experience are regarded as salient sources of competitive advantage for firms. Hillman, 
Canella, and Paetzold (2000) proposed that government-connected boards provide their firms 
with intangible resources, such as valuable information and access to key officials who 
influence their business. Hillman and Hitt (1999) also found that firms with former 
government officials on their boards enjoy better performance than those lacking such 
directors.  
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In our study, therefore, we adopt an RDT perspective and focus on the role of former 
government officials in their firm’s internationalization efforts. Specifically, we argue that in 
Korea a firm’s export propensity and export performance are likely to be influenced by 
boards with government experience. To understand the effect of this specific type of board on 
export propensity and export performance, it is essential to understand the unique Korean 
institutional context and its history, as well as how the execution of corporate governance in 
Korea has developed over time. 
As a part of the Economic Development Plan pursued by the Korean government in the 
1960s, large Korean firms were given preferential treatment, such as loans with lower interest 
rates, despite high inflation (Chang & Choi, 1988). A typical example was the support for 
exporting industries. The economic plan and the accompanying export inducements have 
made the government an established source of export-related support, inducing firms’ 
dependency on those resources (Chang & Hong, 2000).  
Under this institutional environment, we argue that the government-connected boards are 
able to exert more influence on their firms’ exports. This claim can be explained by particular 
Korean social practices and systems as follows. First, Korea has a unique culture called 
‘jeongwan yeu’. This term has almost the same meaning as the Chinese ‘guanxi’, which 
represents close connections between firm managers and government officers based on the 
Confucian culture of alleviating uncertainty and generating business opportunities (Park & 
Luo, 2001). The Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission of Korea (2012, p. 13) defines 
‘jeongwan yeu’ as ‘retired public officials who enter law firms or private companies who may 
act as a lobbyist by using the social networks which they had established during the 
occupancy of their post.’ Since the practice of ‘jeongwan yeu’ is deeply rooted in the Korean 
business environment, we can expect a firm to hire former public officials to lobby 
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government agencies on behalf of its own interests and to seek government support in order 
to exploit international business opportunities. It is important to note that as part of this 
culture, Korean companies are aggressively competing to recruit such former government 
officials and create strong links with the government. In this manner, companies are trying to 
promote their own interests and are lobbying for particular government policies against 
others. Thus, boards with former Korean officials can act as crucial resource providers for 
their firms. 
Second, there is also a particular government appointment system called ‘gosi’, which 
refers to a national civil service examination to select public officers. Traditionally, Korean 
economic development has relied on the powerful political leadership of elite officials with 
bureaucratic top-down communication (Ha & Kang, 2010). In the context of a firm’s export 
activity, former public officials through ‘gosi’ exploit the human and social capital they have 
accumulated during their time in public positions to create a favourable relationship between 
their firms and export-related government bodies, and seek to obtain viable export resources 
such as export finance and export insurance. Government-affiliated banks and institutions 
have played an important role in Korean firms’ export activities. The Export-Import Bank of 
Korea provides diverse financial products for Korean exporters, such as export credit and 
overseas investment credit. The Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (KEIC) also offers 
multiple short-term and medium-term products for both exporters and foreign buyers in order 
to boost Korean firms’ export performance (e.g. short-term export credit insurance) and to 
help foreign buyers to import Korean products (e.g. short-term export insurance, buyer 
credit). Conventionally, former ministers or high-ranking post holders, ‘gosi’ background 
officials at the Ministry of Strategy and Finance and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy move to take on high-rank posts in government-affiliated banks and institutions in 
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Korea. Thus, by leveraging their ‘gosi’ networks with these state-owned institutions, former 
public officials from ‘gosi’ can secure better export-related financial support than those 
without such experience. 
Overall, an RDT perspective illuminates the fact that former public officials are likely to 
serve as intermediaries who bring with them critical resources and information relevant to the 
government and its policies (Chizema et al., 2015). In turn, they significantly impact on their 
firms’ export propensity and performance. Furthermore, in Korea, where the practice of 
‘jeongwan yeu’ is rooted across society beyond the role as resource providers, former 
officials are most likely to attempt to actively change the business environment more 
favourably for their own firm through lobbying the government against adverse policies. 
Based on the aforementioned discussion, we therefore posit the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: A Korean firm’s export propensity is positively associated with the 
presence of a board member with government experience.  
Hypothesis 1b: A Korean firm’s export performance is positively associated with the 
presence of a board member with government experience.  
4.2 MNC experience and exporting  
Firms operating in international markets perform differently and this partly results from 
the different resources they possess and/or manage to obtain in order to reduce uncertainty in 
the external environment. From an RDT perspective, successful firms will manage to acquire 
resources that will facilitate their internationalization efforts. Firms engaged in exporting 
need to develop expertise and knowledge of international markets that will help them act on 
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international business opportunities (Eriksson et al., 1997). In particular, exporting requires 
specific knowledge of how to identify and serve foreign customers.  
According to McDougall, Oviatt, and Shrader (2003) board members with MNC 
experience possess significant knowledge about international markets and trade regulations. 
They may also have developed some external ties and relational capital that can be very 
significant in international business activities (Iriyama & Madhavan, 2014). Board members 
with MNC experience have been regarded as linkage brokers with other organizations and 
their contribution in bringing crucial resources and information needed for their firm’s export 
success has been highly emphasized (Gulati, 1995; Iriyama & Madhavan, 2014). Moreover, 
these board directors act as a channel for export spillovers whereby technology, management 
skills and international marketing techniques may be transferred to parent firms, thus 
positively affecting parent firms’ export propensity and export performance (Filatotchev et 
al., 2009). 
Furthermore, a board member with MNC experience will have developed critical 
relationships with local regulators, financial institutions, high-ranking politicians and 
government officials. Board members with MNC experience, therefore, will be able to 
provide critical contacts, information and tangible resources to facilitate their firm’s export 
activities. For example, a board with MNC experience can effectively alleviate export-related 
uncertainty and obstacles by contributing scarce information gleaned from the international 
networks they developed in their prior work in exporting countries (Iriyama & Madhavan, 
2014; Luo, 2005). They can also facilitate various favourable international loans and 
insurance from local financial institutions, and even access information on cutting-edge 
technology from previous workplaces in order to initiate exports or to increase export sales 
(Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). 
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A body of research has documented the impact of executives with MNC experience on 
various aspects of a firm. Daily, Certo, and Dalton (2000), Roth (1995), and Athanassiou and 
Nigh (2002) show that a firm that has former MNC executives on its board increases its 
competitive advantage by using their previous business networks, as well as their capacity to 
access critical information, both of which enable a firm to effectively operate and expand its 
overseas business. Consistent with this view, Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) reported that a 
board member who has work experience in an MNC has strong job-related connections with 
client firms, subcontractors and regulators. Thus, it is possible that these boards can utilize 
the previous networks of the directors to develop potential strategic partners for their current 
firm to facilitate exports. Lee and MacMillan (2008) underscore that MNCs not only widely 
share standardized training programmes, but also provide appropriate and customized 
training from headquarters to help employees learn global business practices. Therefore, 
board members with MNC experience may act as messengers able to transfer advanced 
training and know-how to the current firm they serve, and help the firm adopt international 
business practices which enhance export propensity and export performance. 
Regarding the Korean context during the Asian financial crisis, the Korean government 
had to deregulate its domestic market in order to receive IMF relief loans. As a result, GM 
acquired Daewoo Motors, Volvo acquired Samsung’s heavy equipment, and Renault acquired 
Samsung Motors (Chang, 2006). Consequently, many Koreans had the chance to work in 
global-leading MNCs and many Korean firms have adopted an American-style HR 
management system since the Asian financial crisis (Kim & Kim, 2003; Kim & Yu, 2000). 
One of these Western HR practices pursued by Korean firms is a corporate hiring policy to 
recruit highly specialized employees that do not require training in order to improve global 
competitiveness and workplace efficiency (Bae et al., 2003; Tayeb, 1998). By fully exploiting 
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their previous experience and social networks in international business, board members with 
MNC experience can extract valuable resources related to foreign trade from organisations 
located in exporting countries. In this sense, board members with MNC experience help the 
firm obtain the necessary capital to facilitate exporting. A board of directors with MNC 
experience possesses valuable human and social capital and therefore can have better access 
to resources, such as relevant market information and connections with local governments 
(Filatotchev et al., 2009). Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: A Korean firm’s export propensity is positively associated with a board’s 
MNC experience. 
Hypothesis 2b: A Korean firm’s export performance is positively associated with a 
board’s MNC experience. 
4.3 Outside directors and exporting  
According to RDT theorists, the outside directors of a firm are expected to help to absorb 
and address the environmental uncertainty facing the firm (Boyd, 1990; Hillman, Cannella, & 
Paetzold, 2000). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 163) noted that “…when an organization 
appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the 
organization, will concern himself/herself with its problems, will variably present it to others, 
and will try to aid it.” They proposed that organizations can accrue three specific benefits 
from board linkages: advice and consultancy, legitimacy and communication channels, as 
well as preferential treatment and support. These benefits are derived from the human capital 
(e.g. expertise, skills and knowledge) and relational capital of outside directors (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). Thus, having more outside directors would have a positive signalling effect 
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which would enhance export propensity and export performance by stimulating an increase in 
their firms’ legitimacy among their shareholders, providing resources through their social 
networks and decreasing export-related environmental uncertainty. As a consequence, it leads 
to the initiating of exporting and / or increased export sales (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Rivas, 
2012a, 2012b; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). 
Moreover, based on the RDT, outside directors have a variety of viewpoints on analyzing 
the environment, stemming from their experience and social networks, and thus they are able 
to offer insightful and helpful solutions to resolve business problems (Bethel & Rindova, 
1994). According to Pearce and Zahra (1992), having more outside directors brings more 
strategic change than a board of directors dominated by insiders. Outside directors can 
provide valuable information and advice/counsel to the CEOs, as proposed by RDT theorists 
(Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). For instance, financial resources such as trade finance 
and trade insurance play crucial roles for exporters in starting exporting and in boosting 
export performance (Sherman, Kashlak, & Joshi, 1998). Drawing on the RDT, Sanders and 
Carpenter (1998) explain that when a firm has more outside directors, it implies an advantage 
in terms of internationalization because of efficient governance arrangements which enable 
them to manage complexities according to the internationalization process. Consequently, we 
expect that when a firm hires a higher percentage of external board directors within the total 
number of board directors, these outside board directors may be more extensively networked 
and have a greater reputation as well as international knowledge. Thus, they not only enable 
their firm to be more effective in the acquisition of information needed for export decisions, 
but also bring in international knowledge that contributes to successful exporting. Lu, Xu, 
and Liu (2009) show that increasing the number and role of outside directors’ helps to 
increase both export propensity and export performance using Chinese sample data.  
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Regarding the Korean context, the Asian financial crisis 1997-1998 was a turning point 
in the development of the board system in Korea (Joh, 2003). In return for providing relief 
loans, the IMF demanded broad reforms across the Korean economy to enhance the 
vulnerable Korean corporate governance system (Joh, 2003). As a result, the Korean 
government has tightened up on outside director-related laws by requiring that outside 
directors should account for more than 25 per cent of board members (Choi, Park, & Yoo, 
2007). Thus, it is timely to explore the relationships among board directors as well as export 
propensity and export performance. We expect that a firm with a higher proportion of outside 
directors will achieve better export propensity and export performance than those with a 
lower proportion of outsiders on their boards. Based on the discussion above, we propose 
that: 
Hypothesis 3a: A Korean firm’s export propensity is positively associated with the 
proportion of outside directors. 
Hypothesis 3b: A Korean firm’s export performance is positively associated with the 
proportion of outside directors. 
 
5. Research Design 
5.1 Sample and data 
We collected data from all the 642 non-financial listed firms in Korea over a seven-year 
period from 2001 to 2007. There are two reasons for choosing 2001 as the initial year of 
analysis. First, though the Korean government’s official records include firms’ annual reports 
from 1999, a substantial amount of information was missing in the early available years. 
Second, our main research purpose is to examine the board members as resource providers in 
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the context of corporate governance reform. We, therefore, used annual reports beginning in 
2001. Financial firms were excluded from our sample because their accounting structure 
differs from that of non-financial firms (Chizema et al., 2015). A few steps were taken to 
clean the data. First, we decided to use the same fiscal year for the sample firms in order to 
establish year dummy variables, so we excluded 27 firms with a different fiscal year to 
circumvent the confounding effects. Second, 65 firms did not provide relevant information. 
Third, 34 firms were dropped as they were spin-off firms which happened during the 
observation period due to the increase in radical financial transactions, such as increasing 
insider-trading profit (Brockman, Li, & Price, 2013). As a result, our final sample consists of 
516 (=642-27-65-34) firms. 
Our data were drawn from the Korea Information Service (KIS). The KIS is analogous to 
COMPUSTAT from Standard & Poor’s (Chang & Hong, 2002) and it provides reliable 
corporate and financial information. Similar data have been employed by a number of 
researchers (e.g. Chang & Hong, 2002; Chang & Rhee, 2011; Joh, 2003). Moreover, we also 
collected board information from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer system (DART) 
from the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) of Korea.  
5.2 Dependent, independent and control variables 
In this subsection, we introduce the variables used in this study, and Table 1 defines these 
variables in detail. Following the existing studies (Fernández, & Nieto, 2006; Gao et al., 
2010), we used two dependent variables, export propensity (labelled EPR) and export 
performance (labelled EP). The former indicates whether a firm is exporting or not and 
reflects the firm’s intent of expanding to overseas markets (Filatotchev et al., 2009). The 
latter measured export intensity which was captured by the ratio of export sales to total sales. 
These two measures are widely used as indicators for export propensity (whether to export) 
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and export performance (how much to export) (Buck, et al., 2007; Lu, Xu, & Liu, 2009). In 
the data analysis, we classify the sample firms into two categories: exporters and non-
exporters. If a firm has export revenues in excess of 0 won, we regard the firm as an exporter. 
Conversely, if a firm reported 0 won in export revenues, it is a non-exporter.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
To capture the effectiveness of board directors with former official experience (labelled 
OFFICIAL) and MNC experience (labelled MNC), we created two dummy variables to 
measure board directors’ past official experience and MNC experience. There are two reasons 
why we used the dummy variables. As aforementioned, MNCs have actively operated in 
Korea since the Asian financial crisis and local Koreans have had opportunities to work for 
MNCs. Therefore, there are a small number of board directors (8%) who have had MNC 
work experience. Following existing studies (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Stiles, 2001), we 
considered board directors a team in order to examine the board directors’ resource provider 
role. Although a board functions as a group (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Stiles, 2001), 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) and Payne, Benson, and Finegold (2009) stress that only a limited 
number of studies treat boards as a team. We used the proportion of outside directors 
(labelled OUTSIDE) to assess the extent of the outside directors’ resource provider role 
(Payne, Benson, & Finegold, 2009; Kim, 2007). 
We included nine control variables based on previous research on the determinants of 
export performance. We controlled for firm size (labelled as SIZE) because it affects a firm’s 
export behaviors (Gao et al., 2010). We controlled for board size (labelled BOARD) because 
it may affect a firm’s internationalization (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). A firm’s technology 
and marketing capabilities were controlled to capture the impact of intangible assets on 
exporting (Chang & Hong, 2000). As Chang and Rhee (2011) note, chaebols may have a 
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greater advantage in overseas sales than non-chaebols because they have a plurality of 
foreign subsidiaries to aid effectively the development of new customers and maintain current 
clients. Thus, we controlled for Korean business groups, chaebols (labelled CHAEBOLS). 
The leverage ratio (labelled LEVERAGE) is controlled as an important indicator of Korean 
firms’ capacity for international expansion, given that Korean firms depend on debt financing 
for their internationalization efforts (Chang, 2003). We controlled for the sample firms’ past 
financial performance (labelled ROIC) (Chang & Hong, 2000; 2002) to capture the impact of 
past financial performance on a firm’s decision concerning export activities (Hortinha, Lages, 
& Lages, 2011; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992).  
Finally, following the Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC), industry 
dummies (labelled IND) and year dummies (labelled YED) are constructed to control for 
economy-wide, year-specific shocks and time-invariant firm heterogeneity. Industry dummies 
were used to establish fixed effects in the Heckman two-stage model. Technically, there is no 
clear-cut agreement regarding whether to estimate fixed effects or random effects to control 
for firm heterogeneity in the Heckman model. In order to remedy this issue, we used industry 
dummies and year dummies to establish panel data by controlling for firm heterogeneity and 
estimating causality because it is difficult to establish each firm’s interaction terms in 
regressions (Hsiao, 1986). This is the main reason that we used industry dummy variables 
instead of firm dummy variables to estimate fixed effects.  
 
6. Empirical Results  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations. It indicates that the highest value of 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) is 1.19. Therefore, multicollinearity is not a serious 
problem in this study. In our sample, 48.2% of former officials had been heavily involved the 
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industry and trade policies and had executed these policies strategically in their previous 
posts. Specifically, 33.41% of former officials had worked for the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance, and 14.79% of former officials had served in the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy. 
 
Insert Table 2about here 
 
6.1 Heckman two-stage model 
While some firms export, others do not. Thus, our dependent variables are binary 
(exporting firm=1, non-exporting firm=0) based on a firm’s export strategy choice, and this 
implies that our study may suffer from self-selection bias (Shaver, 1998). To address this 
issue, we apply the Heckman two-stage model. The Heckman (1979) two-stage model is 
more flexible and accurate than the Tobit model because it accounts for sample selection bias 
and uses two different parameters for the main equations of export propensity and export 
performance, respectively, while the Tobit model uses a single slope for both equations and 
does not consider the endogeneity issue. 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model involves the two-stage estimation. In the first stage, 
export propensity is estimated through the Probit analysis, and the IMR was extracted and 
used to estimate the probability values in the Probit regression. Then, in the second stage, 
export performance or export intensity is estimated through a truncated regression analysis 
including the IMR as one of the independent variables. To link the first stage and second 
stage, an estimated value for the IMR, denoted lambda or the hazard rate, is used to correct 
for selection bias (Heckman, 1979). In this study, we established a selection equation to take 
account of whether a company was exporting or not for measuring export propensity. We 
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coded EXPO=1 for an exporting firm and EXPO=0 for a non-exporting firm in the binary 
dependent variable. Thus, the selection equation regarding EPR is defined as follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛼𝛼5𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛼𝛼6𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛼𝛼9𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼10𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑋𝑋it +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
                                                                                                                            (1)  
Then, we estimated the main equation with EP as the dependent variable.  
  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽6𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽10𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽11𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽12𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(2) 
 
 
for i = 1,2, … , n and t = 1,2 … , T. 
In equations (1) and (2), the main variables of interest in this study are OFFICIAL, MNC, 
and OUTSIDE as we defined above. We also include SIZE, BOARD, MKT, TECH, 
CHAEBOLS, LEVERAGE, and ROIC as control variables that may affect a firm’s EPR and 
EP. X is a set of YED and 14 IND variables. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
We report the main results from testing the hypotheses in Tables 2 and 3 with respect to 
both EPR and EP. Endogeneity is not a major concern here because the IMR is significant in 
the models for both EPR and EP (Tucker, 2010). These results suggest that Heckman’s (1979) 
two-stage approach is appropriate for this study. 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 examine whether the board of directors plays a critical role in 
providing important resources for Korean firms by testing their effect on a firm’s EPR and 
EP. The variable of OFFICIAL is positively and significantly associated with EPR in model 4 
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in Table 2. However, there is an insignificant relationship between this variable and EP in 
model 4 in Table 3. Thus, hypothesis 1(a) is supported, but hypothesis 1(b) is not. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Tables 3 and 4 respectively report the results of the impact of MNC on EPR and EP. The 
results from testing hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b) are consistent with our hypotheses and indicate 
that MNC has a significant and positive association with both EPR and EP. Thus, hypotheses 
2(a) and 2(b) are supported. 
Insert Table 4here 
The variable of OUTSIDE is positively and significantly related to both EPR and EP in 
Tables 3 and 4 respectively. Therefore, hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b), which test whether there is a 
positive association between OUTSIDE (directors) and Korean firms’ EPR and EP, are also 
supported. 
6.2 Additional analyses 
To complement the Heckman two-stage model, we conducted additional analyses using the 
quantile regression method to deal with causality issues by further assessing the impact of a 
board with government and MNC experience, and the proportion of outside directors, on a 
firm’s export propensity and export performance. The quantile regression method was 
introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and is widely used in IB and management research 
(Gallego-Álvarez & Ortas, 2017; Paniagua, Figueiredo, & Sapena, 2015; Ramdani & 
Witteloostuijn, 2010). A simple linear regression method uses the conditional means of the 
variables, and thus crucial data characteristics may not be visible when the distribution of the 
dependent variable in the regression shows significant heterogeneity and non-normality 
(Coad & Rao, 2006). In contrast, the quantile regression offers more flexible and more robust 
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estimates than the mean regression, thus making it possible to better capture the response of 
the dependent variable by indicating how each independent variable affects the dependent 
variable (Gallego-Álvarez & Ortas, 2017; Koenker & Bassett, 1978; Ramdani & 
Witteloostuijn, 2010). Technically, the quantile regression method does not apply to binary 
dependent variables, and thus we conduct this test on EP as the dependent variable.  
In order to estimate several quantile regressions simultaneously, we examine and 
construct confidence intervals to compare the coefficients between quantiles. Within this 
estimation method, we consider the following simultaneous conditional quantile models 
using with the same measurements as we constructed for the Heckman sample selection 
model:  
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸it =  α + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸it + �𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
j+ �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖
t
𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂t + θ𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +  εit 
 
(3) 
 
In Eq. (3), the coefficient  indicates how EP is influenced by the three independent 
variables. In the set of other covariates ( ) that may affect a firm’s EP, we include SIZE, 
BOARD, MKT, TECH, CHAEBOLS, LEVERAGE, and ROIC. Lastly, we also control for YED 
and IND. 
Insert Table 5 here 
In Table 5, we report nine different quantiles from the 10th to the 90th quantiles which 
were used to gauge the different impacts of the three independent variables at different levels 
of distribution of EP. The results indicate that most of the signs of the coefficients regarding 
the three independent variables are in line with our predictions in Models 9 to 11. 
β
X
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Insert Figure 1 here 
One advantage of simultaneous quantile regressions is that we can see the dynamics in 
our main interested variables. We used the Lowess method to plot graphs (Cleveland, 1979). 
Figure 1 shows OFFICIAL coefficients estimated using the simultaneous quantile regression. 
Most quantiles are statistically insignificant except 40th and 90thquantiles. However, if we 
focus on the sign of the pattern of coefficients, OFFICIAL positively influences EP. The 
positive effect is steadily increased from 10th to 90thquantiles. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
Figure 2 illustrates that MNC exhibits a positive impact on EP in every quantile (from the 
20th to 90th quantiles being statistically significant). The positive impact of MNC is increased 
until the 50th quantile of EP. This implies that firms with higher EP respond more to the 
MNC variable, but this positive impact does not change substantially when moving beyond 
the 50th quantile of EP distribution. 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Lastly, Figure 3 indicates that OUTSIDE also has a positive effect on EP in every 
quantile: seven out of nine quantiles are statistically significant. Notably, OUTSIDE exhibits 
a more positive effect from the lower to the upper tail of the distribution of EP. Taken 
together, the results of the quantile regressions are consistent with our main findings, thus 
further confirming that the main results do not suffer from reverse causality.  
 
7. Discussion 
7.1 The main findings 
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Adopting the resource dependency perspective, we examine the impact of the resource 
provision role of board members on export propensity and export performance for a sample 
of Korean firms. More specifically, we empirically test the relationship between board 
members with previous government experience and board members with MNC experience, as 
well as the proportion of outside directors, and the export propensity and export performance 
of Korean firms. We have additionally investigated the impact of these main variables on a 
firm’s export performance using the simultaneous quantile regression method. As explained 
above, we conducted our investigation in the Korean context and accounted for some specific 
institutional characteristics of this context under which the composition of the board affects 
exporting. 
We have obtained a number of interesting findings. First, the presence of a board 
member with government experience represents a relatively distinct aspect of the Korean 
culture which has received little attention so far. We found empirical support for former 
officials having a positive effect on export propensity. This may suggest that a former official 
is effective in initiating a firm’s export activities, perhaps due to their ability to extract 
essential export-related resources from outside the firm. Board directors with government 
experience may influence government-related banks or state-owned institutions facilitating 
export financing and, thus, enhance a firm’s export propensity in the Korean context based on 
‘gosi’ and ‘jeongwan yeu’ cultures. Contrary to our expectations, former officials do not have 
a positive effect on export performance. The quantile regression results are also in line with 
our main analysis based on the Heckman model: most quantiles exhibit as statistically 
insignificant. Thus, it further confirms our main result that board directors with former 
official experienced do not affect Korean firms’ export performance. This finding may 
suggest that when firms expand internationally, they face challenges in translating the 
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advantages associated with government experience or political connections into export 
performance. The advantages associated with political connections are not universal, but 
context specific. This may be the reason why board members with formal government 
experience have little impact on export performance in international markets.   
Second, we confirm that the MNC experience of board members is positively associated 
with both export propensity and export performance. The findings complement the prior 
literature which has overlooked the impact of MNC experience on firm internationalization in 
the Korean context (Chizema & Kim, 2010; Cho & Kim, 2007). Since the Asian financial 
crisis, more Korean workers have had an opportunity to work for MNCs, through which they 
learn best practices and develop networks (Chang, 2006). Board members with MNC 
experience may be effective in facilitating exporting due to their international experience and 
their understanding of how to initiate, operate and develop exporting activities, given that 
most of the MNCs operating in Korea have developed a long history and good track record in 
international business relative to local Korean companies. In this regard, board members with 
MNC experience may have accumulated both human and social capital and thus serve not 
only as resource providers to facilitate exporting by exploiting their social networks, but also 
act as important sources of human capital.  
The results based on the quantile regression are consistent with those obtained from the 
Heckman model, thus further supporting our arguments that boards with MNC experience 
facilitate the identification of overseas business opportunities (McDougall, Oviatt, & Shrader, 
2003) and act as a good channel to bring in crucial external resources (Filatotchev et al., 
2009), especially for small and medium-sized Korean exporting firms.  
Finally, we test whether outside directors play an important role in enhancing Korean 
firms’ export propensity and export performance. We find that the presence of outside 
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directors improves both the export propensity and export performance of the sample firms. It 
is worth examining the role of outside directors as the outside director system originated from 
the system of Anglo-American governance, and was introduced in Korea in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis. Our finding supports the notion that outside directors have the ability 
to contribute additional resources to enhance the export sales of Korean firms (Kim, 2005). 
As shown in our additional analyses, a firm having more outside directors leads to an increase 
in export performance from 10th to 90th quantiles. As quantiles go up, the coefficient of the 
variable of outside directors is increased. In other words, firms with more outside directors 
exhibit higher levels of exports. One plausible explanation for these findings might be due to 
corporate governance reforms in Korea, such as appointing outside directors in the aftermath 
of the 1997-1998 financial crisis. Outside directors bring more external resources to boost 
their firms’ exporting. The findings support not only our main results more vividly, but also 
confirm again the resource provision role of board members in their firms’ 
internationalization, underpinned by RDT. 
Taken together, a Korean board is more likely to contribute to export propensity when its 
members include former government officials and those with MNC work experience, as well 
as outside directors. The latter two types of board members (with MNC work experience, and 
outsider directors) also positively affect the export performance of their firms. Our findings 
thus provide a more complete picture regarding the resource provision role of board members 
in exporting in the Korean context. 
7.2 Contributions 
This study contributes to the fields of IB and corporate governance in a number of ways. 
First, by exploring the impact of board members’ specific characteristics on Korean firms’ 
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export propensity and export performance, this research complements prior research by 
emphasizing the resource provision role of board directors in exporting. Previous studies on 
export performance have tended to focus on internal capability, industry competition and 
institutional environments (Buck, et al., 2007; Chen, Sousa, & He, 2016; Gao, et al., 2010), 
but have paid little attention to the impact of board directors with government experience and 
MNE experience on exporting.  
One the other hand, extent research on corporate governance has overly focused on the 
monitoring role of board directors underpinned by the dominant paradigm of agency theory 
(Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Rivas, 2012a; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Such a 
focus overlooks the resource provision role of board directors. We move beyond the existing 
studies and unpack the link between board directors and firms’ export propensity and export 
performance. The findings enhance our understanding of the determinants of export 
propensity and export performance by revealing different dimensions of board directors from 
a resource dependency perspective. Relatedly, by explicitly focusing on export activities, our 
study enriches prior research by moving away from financial performance and firm value to 
consideration of other type of organizational outcomes, such as export performance. This 
helps to provide a more complete account of the impact of board directors on their 
organizations.  
 Second, this study expands the resource dependency perspective to a unique 
institutional context where the government and businesses are closely intertwined. Our 
research demonstrates that the country-specific institutional setting is important in 
understanding the impact of board directors. There is a unique culture called ‘jeongwan yeu’ 
regarding former officials in Korea. After retirement, they move to companies or law firms as 
lobbyists. This research sheds light on how the background of board members as former 
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government officials can affect a firm’s export propensity in an institutional context with 
strong government intervention based on ‘jeongwan yeu’. In addition, a number of Korean 
firms recruit board members with MNC experience in order to compete with foreign MNCs 
that have entered the Korean market. Third, after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the 
Korean government enacted a law that Korean firms must have at least 25% of total board 
members made up of outside board members. The impact of these corporate governance 
changes on outside directors has been underexplored (Cho & Kim, 2007; Kim, 2007), 
especially with regard to Korean firms’ export propensity and export performance. Hence, 
our research provides new insight into the benefit of political connections, MNC experience 
and outside directors in exporting, and captures elements of power and dependency in the 
Korean context.  
Finally, we not only controlled for endogeneity by estimating the Heckman two-stage 
model with firm-level fixed effects, but also controlled for causality issues using the 
simultaneous quantile regression. We thus add much needed empirical evidence to the 
relationship between the characteristics of board directors and the first step of 
internationalization by firms in an emerging economy. 
7.3 Policy and managerial implications  
This research has several implications for policy makers and managers. As board 
members, former officials can improve their firms’ export propensity. Thus, if a firm is eager 
to export, it would benefit from hiring former officials as board members to access crucial 
external resources. When firms expand internationally, they face challenges in translating the 
advantages associated with government experience or political connections into export 
performance. This may imply that the adverse selection problem will generate a high social 
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cost if firms with a low capacity, limited R&D and product development capabilities engage 
in exporting based on their directors’ political ties. 
It is also especially important for export-oriented firms to have qualified board members 
with MNC experience because their international knowledge and social capital are beneficial 
in initiating and increasing export sales. Our findings suggest that firms need to consider the 
characteristics of board directors in establishing a human resource strategy to effectively 
recruit and retain the talent they need to improve their export propensity and export 
performance. Finally, this study empirically confirms that the more outside directors a firm 
has, the better its export propensity and export performance will be. The result implies that 
firms with a tendency to appoint outside directors who are able to provide external resources 
will prove to be more successful in enhancing export propensity and export performance. Our 
findings also provide empirical evidence that supports the government-led reform to 
introduce the outside-director system, which is beneficial to firm internationalization. 
7.4 Limitations and directions for future research 
Our study has a number of limitations that indicate the need for future research. First, it is 
difficult to measure the quality of each board member. For instance, there are MNCs such as 
Coca-Cola and P&G that represent leading firms in their respective industries. MNC 
experience may be heterogeneous. To address this issue, it may be beneficial to combine 
information using survey and qualitative methods. Related, while we have adopted a 
commonly used measure for outside directors, we are unable to measure the background and 
quality of individual outside directors due to data availability. Future studies should use a 
more fine-grained proxy to accurately capture the resource provision role of outside directors 
with different skills and knowledge.   
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Second, our research is based on a sample of Korean firms. The results may not be 
generalizable to firms in other countries. Future research is needed to compare our results 
with those from other countries using firm-level data, or to extend our research to other 
emerging economies.  
Third, we attempted to collect information on board members to compare the results 
before and after the reform of the corporate governance system in Korea. The Korean 
government, however, only provided such information for the period after the 
implementation of the outside-director policy. It would be a valuable research avenue to 
compare firm export propensity and export performance before and after the corporate 
governance reform in Korea over a longer period, once data are available. 
Fourth, we measured former government experiences and the MNC experience of the 
board directors as dummy variables. Therefore, further research could use more fine-grained 
measures to capture the impact of the characteristics of board directors on firm 
internationalization. Furthermore, it may be meaningful to examine the relationships between 
interlocking directorate networks and internationalization performance. The Korean annual 
reports, however, provide very limited board information enabling researchers to examine 
political ties between board directors and main politicians, such as president and head of 
ministers. Thus, researchers should find alternative methodologies, or a different data set, to 
measure these relationships in future research. 
Fifth, while we have made a great effort to tackle causality issues by adopting the 
Heckman sample selection model and simultaneous quantile regression, we cannot claim that 
our findings are free from the causality issue. It is generally recognized that it is difficult to 
perfectly control for causality issues. In this regard, our research also contains this commonly 
acknowledged limitation. Future research should use various methodologies such as a case 
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study or survey method to verify our findings. Lastly, future research could examine the role 
of the board of directors as resource providers, and the composition of the board beyond the 
first step of internationalization, such as foreign direct investment and cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions.  
8. Conclusion 
This study represents an extension of prior IB and corporate governance research by 
exploring the effect of the resource provider role of boards on firm export propensity and 
export performance, given that this aspect has received little attention from scholars. Drawing 
on RDT, we focused on examining the extent to which board members with former official 
experience, and those with MNC backgrounds, as well as the proportion of outside directors 
overall, affect the first step of internationalization, based on a sample of Korean firms. 
We have obtained a number of interesting results. First, there is empirical support for 
former officials having a positive effect on export propensity through their capacity to 
provide resources to enhance export activities. There is, however, no empirical evidence 
supporting export performance. Second, we confirmed that MNC experience is positively 
associated with both export propensity and export performance. Finally, the proportion of 
outside directors is positively associated with export propensity and export performance. This 
study moves beyond existing studies on the monitoring role of the board of directors and 
sheds new light on the resource provision role of board members in exporting.  
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Table 1 Summary of variables 
        
Dependent variables       
EPR A dummy variable that takes value of 1, if a firm is exporting, 0 otherwise 
EP The ratio of export sales to the total sales    
        
Independent variables       
OFFICIAL A dummy variable if a board member has any of former official experience 
MNC A dummy variable if a board member has any of MNC experience  
OUTSIDE The proportion of outside directors to the total number of board members 
      
        
Control variables       
SIZE Natural log of total assets     
BOARD The total number of board members    
TECH R&D expenditures divided by total sales    
MKT Advertising expenditures divided by total sales    
CHAEBOLS A dummy variable that takes the values of 1 if it belongs to chaebols, 0 otherwise 
LEVERAGE Total firm liabilities divided by total firm assets    
ROIC 
 
The sum of net income before tax plus interest payments 
(Net Operating Profit-Adjusted Taxes)/Invested Capital   
YED Year dummies from 2001 to 2007 inclusive    
IND Industry dummies for the 14 industries    
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
              
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 EP 1.000            
2 EPR 0.093 1.000           
3 OFFICIAL 0.018 0.078 1.000          
4 MNC  0.050 0.100 0.120 1.000         
5 OUTSIDE 0.061 0.068 0.185 0.064 1.000        
6 SIZE 0.053 0.174 0.238 0.206 0.284 1.000       
7 BOARD 0.041 0.026 0.035 0.063 0.054 0.080 1.000      
8 MKT -0.041 -0.029 -0.042 -0.024 -0.037 -0.008 0.046 1.000     
9 TECH 0.217 0.017 0.020 0.011 -0.010 0.020 -0.006 0.271 1.000    
10 CHAEBOLS 0.022 -0.044 0.121 0.077 0.285 -0.068 0.162 0.044 0.033 1.000   
11 LEVERAGE -0.009 -0.036 0.020 -0.042 0.052 -0.010 0.003 -0.025 -0.007 0.059 1.000  
12 ROIC -0.007 -0.060 -0.017 -0.009 -0.018 -0.034 -0.027 -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 -0.045 1.000 
              
 Mean 0.319 0.706 0.215 0.076 0.322 26.208 5.824 0.009 0.016 0.204 0.470 22.346 
 SD 0.027 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.024 0.047 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.009 7.182 
  VIF 1.08 1.03 1.08 1.07 1.19 1.02 1.16 1.02 1.01 1.17 1.07 1.01 
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Table 3 Factors affecting export propensity (EPR) 
Variables EO 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
INTERCEPT -0.428* -0.344* -0.302*  -0.352*  
 (0.507) (0.509) (0.512) (0.514) 
OFFICIAL  2.191**  0.196***  0.181**    (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) 
MNC   0.469***  0.467***   (0.133) (0.133) 
OUTSIDE    0.443*    (0.255) 
SIZE -0.010 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
BOARD 0.060***  0.054***   0.047***  0.042***   
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
MKT -2.425 -2.051 -2.046 -1.989 
 (1.430) (1.443) (1.436) (1.443) 
TECH 5.156*** 5.041***   5.173***  4.970***  
 (1.296) (1.301) (1.316) (1.318) 
CHAEBOLS 0.046 0.024 0.008 -0.024 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.078) 
LEVERAGE 0.409***  0.375***   0.426*** 0.402***  
 (0.144) (0.144) (0.145) (0.146) 
ROIC -0.007***  -0.007***  -0.008***  -0.007***  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
YED02 0.056 0.048 0.045 0.043 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) 
YED03 -0.001 -0.009 -0.014 -0.023 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) 
YED04 0.039 0.037 0.033 0.021 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) 
YED05 -0.000 -0.006 -0.013 -0.030 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) 
YED06 0.041 0.033 0.031 0.013 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) 
YED07 0.021 0.011 0.003 -0.016 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) 
     
Tau-a 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Concordant 80.31% 80.31% 80.28% 80.59% 
Log likelihood -1316.83 -1316.62 -1316.37 -1310.15 
Number of observations 3083 3083 3083 3081 
Note) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   
Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry dummies fixed effects are included and not shown. 
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Table 4 Factors affecting export performance (EP) 
Variables EP 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
INTERCEPT -2.330*  -2.677**   -3.016**   -2.942**  
 (1.175) (1.168) (1.365) (1.279) 
OFFICIAL  0.140 0.150 0.106  (0.122) (0.145) (0.132) 
MNC   0.503**  0.482**   (0.226) (0.210) 
OUTSIDE    1.014**   (0.457) 
SIZE 0.035 0.033 0.027 0.025 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.036) (0.034) 
BOARD 0.062*  0.066***  0.064**  0.052**  
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026) 
MKT -5.716*** -5.627**  -5.524**  -5.477**  
 (2.123) (2.202) (2.709) (2.522) 
TECH 5.243***  5.278***  5.344***   5.288***  
 (0.478) (0.504) (0.618) (0.572) 
CHAEBOLS 0.151 0.142 0.123 0.037 
 (0.112) (0.116) (0.143) (0.138) 
LEVERAGE 0.008 0.041 0.171 0.076 
 (0.239) (0.244) (0.306) (0.280) 
ROIC -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
IMR 1.792* 2.191**   2.700***   2.505***   
 (0.938) (0.914) (1.042) (0.959) 
YED02 0.053 0.056 0.059 0.041 
 (0.153) (0.165) (0.203) (0.188) 
YED03 0.156 0.152 0.148 0.119 
 (0.151) (0.163) (0.201) (0.188) 
YED04 0.265* 0.271*  0.272 0.230 
 (0.152) (0.164) (0.201) (0.187) 
YED05 0.025 0.024 0.012 -0.036 
 (0.151) (0.162) (0.200) (0.187) 
YED06 0.038 0.042 0.043 -0.010 
 (0.152) (0.162) (0.200) (0.186) 
YED07 0.033 0.034 0.028 -0.026 
 (0.151) (0.161) (0.198) (0.185) 
     
Number of observations 3040 3040 3040 3038 
Note) * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   
Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry dummies fixed effects are included and not shown. 
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Table 5 Simultaneous quantile regression estimates for the impact of OFFICIAL, MNC, OUTSIDE 
          
 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
SIZE 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.014**  0.012 0.017*   0.034***  
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
BOARD 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006**  -0.008*  -0.007**    -0.017***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
MKT 0.000 -0.236**  -0.892***  -1.657***  -2.649***  -3.402***  -4.409***  -5.564*** -6.129***  
 (0.010) (0.117) (0.142) (0.237) (0.286) (0.374) (0.406) (0.431) (0.449) 
TECH 0.000 0.023 0.470 0.705 0.990 1.769 2.627 4.811*  7.250**  
 (0.061) (0.394) (0.614) (0.952) (1.514) (2.683) (3.102) (2.868) (2.855) 
CHAEBOLS 0.000 0.003 0.022**   0.068***  0.099***   0.121***  0.101***  0.015 0.088**  
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (0.040) 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.042 0.042 0.025 0.034 -0.062 -0.038 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.019) (0.031) (0.043) (0.048) (0.074) (0.079) (0.066) 
ROIC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
YED02 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.017 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.043) (0.050) (0.042) 
YED03 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.005 0.045 0.009 -0.011 -0.034 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.019) (0.029) (0.047) (0.038) (0.055) 
YED04 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.007 0.052*   0.017 0.006 -0.006 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.008) (0.018) (0.023) (0.030) (0.051) (0.053) (0.049) 
YED05 0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.029 -0.009 -0.027 -0.018 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.029) (0.038) (0.039) (0.050) 
YED06 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.011 -0.000 0.014 -0.032 -0.039 -0.036 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.022) (0.035) (0.041) (0.056) 
YED07 0.000 -0.000 -0.012 -0.014 -0.008 -0.001 -0.031 -0.033 -0.037 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.028) (0.045) (0.051) (0.057) 
CONSTANT 0.000 -0.032 -0.042 -0.038 -0.127 -0.339**  -0.149 -0.070 -0.268 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.032) (0.066) (0.094) (0.163) (0.207) (0.239) (0.274) 
OFFICIAL 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.030***  0.025 0.025 0.031 0.032 0.051*  
(Model 9) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.030) 
MNC 0.000 0.028** 0.135** 0.250***  0.225*** 0.208*** 0.194***  0.142***  0.133***  
(Model 10) (0.000) (0.014) (0.060) (0.053) (0.028) (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) 
OUTSIDE 0.000 0.024 0.094***   0.198*** 0.254*** 0.239***  0.346*** 0.477***  0.588***  
(Model 11) (0.001) (0.015) (0.031) (0.046) (0.055) (0.041) (0.082) (0.073) (0.102) 
Note)  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Number of observations: 3081. Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry dummies fixed effects are included and not shown. 
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Figure 1 OFFICIAL coefficients vs. a dense set of quantiles 
 
Figure 2 MNC coefficients vs. a dense set of quantiles 
 
Figure 3 OUTSIDE coefficients vs. a dense set of quantiles 
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